

# NEGOTIATION OF DEMOCRACY FOR INTERRELIGIOUS DIALOGUE IN PAPUA

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**Abstract:** Salah satu modal untuk mengembangkan dialog antaragama di Indonesia umumnya dan Papua khususnya adalah demokrasi. Demokrasi dikembangkan di tengah keragaman suku dan agama sehingga demokrasi dapat menjadi salah satu jalan keluar untuk mengolah keragaman itu secara politis. Dialog sejalan dengan proses demokrasi itu, terutama karena keduanya mengandaikan prasyarat yang hampir sama. Walaupun demikian, dalam struktur nilai ideologis bangsa, demokrasi itu ada pada urutan sesudah asas keagamaan sehingga paham demokrasi itu dipengaruhi dan diberi corak baru menurut konsep demokrasi setiap agama. Pada gilirannya hal itu akan mempengaruhi praktek demokrasi dalam pengembangan dialog antaragama. Komunitas agama Kristen dan Islam di Indonesia menerima demokrasi, bukan hanya tidak berlawanan dengan ajaran agamanya, tetapi bahkan demokrasi itu mewujudkan ajaran agama. Bila demikian, pengembangan demokrasi di Indonesia bisa memberi jalan bagi dialog antara agama.

**Keywords:** democracy • interreligious dialogue • *musyawarah* • public space • Papua •

*W* *adah Musyawarah Antar-Umat Beragama* (WMAUB - Forum of Interreligious Council) has ever been an official forum for different religious leaders to dialogue interreligiously. By using the term “*musyawarah*”, it implicitly relates interreligious dialogue to deliberative democracy of Pancasila. Democracy, in a narrow sense, is a political system which regulatory power is in the hands of the people. They alone have legitimate political power (Zartman, 2000: 232). There is equality before law, freedom of speech and expression. In a broad sense, democracy means a way of life that puts at the first place consensus, tolerance, readiness to listen and accept the other’s opinion (Print, Orstrom & Nielsen, 2002), commitment to social contract and participation in making decision. The main elements of democracy are freedom and equality.

In the process of creating democracy, religion and democracy influence each other (Race and Shafer, 2002: 19-29, Swidler, 1982: 226-243). Formerly theocracy was perceived as a threat to democracy, but now it is accepted that the prerequisites of democracy are actually supplied by religions.<sup>1</sup> When religion is more open to democracy, then the value of humanity, tolerance, respect for differences, equality, equality before law, freedom of speech, joint decision-making, solidarity, mutual respect and mutual trust will grow in the religions, and they will become more and more open and ready to cooperate and dialogue.<sup>2</sup> Religion certainly leads to a democratic format and to religious dialogue, especially when it has to express its moral doctrines in a common language in public arena.<sup>3</sup> Democracy and interreligious dialogue have the same conditions, i.e. freedom (of religion), equality before law, and pluralism.<sup>4</sup> Democracy induces religions to live in plurality more than merely recognising plurality, and to dialogue, discuss and work together, more than merely coexisting (Darmaputera, 1994: 67). Thus living in a democracy creates a conducive atmosphere to practise interreligious dialogue. Interreligious dialogue is the

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<sup>1</sup>Indonesian democracy has been challenging religions in Indonesia to spell out the meaning of democracy in the respective religions and the relationship between the respective religions and democracy apropos religion's public role (Magnis-Suseno, 1994; Tjahjadi, 2011; Rumadi and Hamdi, 2011). Hilmy, 2008, 182-183, cites Robert Audi and says that there are three principles making religions diachronic to democracy: (1) libertarian principle or principle of tolerance, that guarantees all religious expression in public sphere, (2) equalitarian principle or principle of impartiality, and (3) principle of neutrality. Wahid (2006: 287) adds that only religion with a liberating nature can participate in democracy.

<sup>2</sup>Cf. Darmaputera, 1994: 64-65. Ali (2009: 146-152), argues that religions need to go out of the institutionalism that makes them narrow-minded. They need to develop mutual respect, recognition, positive thinking and attitude, and enriching of faith, and relatively absolute and absolutely relative attitude (Cf. Mulia, 2013: 30).

<sup>3</sup>Cf. Magill, 1993: 678-697. According to Hilmy (2008: 169-175), democracy may be seen as an entry point for the religions to participate in public space. Here each religion must uphold the right of all religions to participate, make rational discourses, and work for the common good, with the legitimate government as arbiter.

<sup>4</sup>Munawar-Rachman (in Taher, 2009: xvii), says that pluralism, religious freedom and democracy are interdependent. There is no democracy without religious freedom, and religious freedom presupposes the recognition of differences (pluralism). In fact, interreligious dialogue made headway in Indonesia in 1990s when the question of the restoration democracy was being discussed in the wake of the fall of communism (Kamal and Madjid, 2006: 128).

manifestation of democracy in religious plurality and it can reinforce the process of democratisation.<sup>5</sup>

In Indonesia, the link between democracy and interreligious dialogue can be traced in Sukarno's explanation of the fourth principle of *Pancasila*.

“For the Muslims, this is the best place to keep religion. And the Islamic heart of Bung Karno wants to defend Islam in consensus, in deliberation. By way of consensus, we refine everything, also the safety of religion, namely by way of discussion or deliberation on the Board of Representatives (Kusuma, 2004:160).”

Thus Sukarno saw a role for religion in politics, even though conditioned by the mechanism of *Pancasila*.<sup>6</sup> Religions are not at all removed from public life but should function in politics in a fair way, that is, by following *Pancasila* in the democracy, instead of using the privileges of the majority. They are expected to participate in democracy and to use it not for religious interests<sup>7</sup> but for building up the nation with spiritual values. Keeping in mind deliberation (*musyawarah*) as main element of Pancasila democracy, Soekarno implicitly gave entry point for religions to interreligiously dialogue as a form of democracy.

This study will elaborate democracy in its relation to developing interreligious dialogue in our tentative to map the possibilities of interreligious dialogue in Papua. The first part outlines democracy based on Indonesian ideology and its challenge in Papua, and then in the second one we will see how democracy is defined by the religious communities in Papua, especially by Christianity and Islam.

### Democracy and Its Challenge in Papua

Practice of democracy in Papua could be originated from Papuan culture and social life. In developing the modern democracy, culture of democracy is affected by political ideology of Pancasila embedded in political system, system of law and in different social life. This culture of democracy has

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<sup>5</sup>Cf. Sumartana 2011: 341-347 and Fortunato-Bowen, 2013: 67-81.

<sup>6</sup>Sukarno often said this idea previously (cf. “Saja Kurang Dinamis” in Soekarno, 1940: 447-455).

<sup>7</sup>In practice, religious dialogue is also conditioned by the laws made by the Parliament, such as Regional Autonomy Law, (religious) Education Law, Law on mass-based Organizations, and Law on the Ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

been growing in cultural limits. In this section we would explore the basic character of democracy and its challenges in Papua.

### ***Basic Spirit***

Democracy in Indonesia is derived from the fourth principle of Pancasila, “Democracy guided by the Inner Wisdom in the unanimity arising out of deliberations amongst representatives”. What is the basic spirit of this democracy? Almost all those involved in the drafting of *Pancasila* held that Indonesia’s democracy should not take form after the liberal-capitalist and individualist democracy of the West (Kusuma, 2004:162). Indonesian culture has its own democratic tradition of the village (*desa*) meeting. *Desa* democracy arose because the land was jointly owned and it always required a meeting, *mufakat* (consensus) and *gotong royong* (mutual cooperation) for being used for the common good. It was related to familial principle and collectivism<sup>8</sup>. In Papua this collectivism is designed by ethnic principle in which *kepala suku* (ethnic leader) has the decisive role. On the one hand there was the sovereignty of the people and on the other hand the mechanism of deliberation for reaching consensus. It follows from the basic inclination of the Indonesians to willingly accept differences without prejudice.

In the history of democracy in Indonesia, the encounter with Islamic culture gave a new thrust to the democratic disposition of the people.<sup>9</sup> Islamic theology emphasizing human equality before God (egalitarianism) favoured cooperation and brotherhood. The example of the Prophet in forming the community in Medina reinforced the practice of deliberation and consensus in the Indonesian culture. Deliberation was practised mostly in the coastal communities that had accepted Islam, as against the feudal societies in the rural areas under the influence of Hinduism. Extending his support to the Indonesian system of democracy, HOS Tjokroaminoto, member of BPUPKI, affirms that “Islam idealizes a

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<sup>8</sup>Hefner (2004: 21-26), says that in Indonesia democracy originated from its socio-culture. According to Hatta, cited by Latif (2012: 387-389, 414-415), village democracy retains the tradition of deliberation, mutual cooperation and economic democracy that give priority to the common interest above factional interests.

<sup>9</sup>Cf. the speech of Hadikusomo in Kusuma (2004: 136-148), and note 8 on p. 142. For Hefner (2004: 21-26), in Indonesia Islam differs from Islam in the Arab lands as in Indonesia it had adapted and absorbed the local cultural elements of pluralism, tolerance, hospitality, equality, civility, familiarity and deliberation (Cf. Hilmy, 2008: 83-89; Hamid, 2014: 131-165).

state with democratic principles in accordance with the Quran” and Islamic democracy is a social democracy (Kusuma, 2004:407). Therefore Sukarno said “I am a Muslim, I am democrat because I’m a Muslim, I want consensus (*mufakat*)” (Kusuma, 2004:163).

By promoting the politics of ethics and *Volkstraad*, the Commission of *Visman* and *Soetardjo* petition, democracy in Indonesia got the humanist character which found democracy on human rights and on the principle of equality before law. Then in Papua these human rights and the principle of equality before law were embeded by Christianity and Dutch goverment.

### ***Sovereignty of the People***

One of the main factor of democracy is the sovereignty of the people. It means that the regulatory power is in the hands of the people and that they alone have legitimate political power. Democratic legitimacy would replace the legitimacy of both the majority religion (Islam) and the monism of ethnic *religi* (Anderson, 2007: 7-8). According to Sukarno, precisely in this manner all the religions in Indonesia are in a position to participate in the democratic process and collaborate *for the people*, for the welfare *of the people*, and *for the common interest*.

For the founding fathers, the sovereignty of the People in western democracy needed to be cleansed of its undercurrents of individualism and liberal capitalism in order to make it suit to their country (Kusuma, 2004: 162).<sup>10</sup> M. Hatta believed that Indonesia should strengthen its tradition of *desa* to make its democracy a success. Tan Malaka, a communist leader, wanted a democracy that was more socialistic, with more room for cooperation and less for individualism. For Sukarno, the spirit of brotherhood (*kekeluargaan*) and mutual assistance (*gotong royong*) should be the guiding principles of democracy; it is democracy that bolsters humanity (socio-nationalism) in order to better the lot of the people. It is a communitarian democracy without being trapped in integralistic-monistic system (Alexis-Baker, 2012: 426-444).

Sovereignty of the people in Papua has to be framed in ethnic collectivism in which their ethnic leader or the big man gets the decesive role. Substantially, there is democracy. In spite of decesive role of leader, all people get opportunity to discuss and express their opinion. There is

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<sup>10</sup>Soekarno referred to sociale *rechtvaardigheid* of Jean Jaures.

freedom of speech supported by self confidence, high self concept and equality. It must be noted that women do not get the same right as men.

### ***Deliberation and Consensus***

A key element of the democracy based on *Pancasila* is deliberation (*musyawarah*), negotiation, giving space to everyone to participate.<sup>11</sup> It is more important than consensus. This mechanism does not eliminate differences and does not interpret a difference as a source of division. Deliberation presupposes tolerance and openness, and is accepted by the democratic society, which is not paternalist and feudalistic, and by the social institutions that are also democratic (Darmaputera, 1994: 60-61). Rooted in Indonesian culture, especially in a collective system as in Papua, deliberation emphasizes togetherness, unity and social solidarity, which surpass the limits of social classes and other barriers so that the system is optimized for the sake of maximum participation of the various representatives.<sup>12</sup>

What determines its uniqueness is the element of kinship, deliberation and wisdom. With the background of unity in the familial spirit, Sukarno says,

“Indonesian state is not a state for one people, not a country for a single class, though the rich, but we establish a state “all for all”, “one for all, all for one”. I am sure that the absolute requirement for the strong state of Indonesia is deliberative (*permusyawaratan*), representative. For the Muslims, this is the best place to keep religion. [...] And the Islamic heart of Bung Karno wants to defend Islam in consensus, in deliberation (*permusyawaratan*). By the way of consensus, we refine everything, including the safety of religion, namely by way of discussion or deliberation on the Board of Representatives. Whatever is not satisfactory, we talk about in the deliberation (Kusuma, 2004: 162).”

*Kekeluargaan* (familial principle) is a mix of several elements borrowed from various sources: *kawula lan gusti* (Javanese), *Hakkoo Itjin*

<sup>11</sup>Cf. Chambers, 2003: 307-326; Latif, 2012: 458-466, 478. The deliberation is based on the need to give reasons. The reasons are accepted by those seeking fair terms of cooperation; they represent the public concerns. The forum where the process takes place is accessible to all the citizens concerned (Cf. Gutmann-Thompson, 2004: 1-21).

<sup>12</sup>Consultation avoids competition as in capitalist democracy. *Pancasila* Democracy is a system that expresses popular sovereignty and social responsibility rather than the embodiment of human rights and individualist freedom (Ali, 2009: 116).

(Japanese), *fard 'ayn* and *fard kifayah* (Islamic socialism),<sup>13</sup> *love* (Christianity), and *radical people's style à la Sukarno*, Hatta's social democracy, and *Supomo's* integralism. The decision is not based merely on the vote of the majority, but on the approval by all (*mufakat* or consensus).<sup>14</sup> Therefore the familial spirit shown in the deliberations emphasizes participation, persuasion, compromise, qualitative consensus, and guidance of wisdom, so that all feel responsible for the decision taken and remain loyal to it. The basis of the deliberations arrived at through the familial principle is brotherhood in equality and the willingness to accept diversity, as shown by the second and third principle of Pancasila. Both are deeply rooted in Indonesian culture that had been shaped also by Islam. Agoes Salim, a member of BPUPKI, gives the example of *sharia* or Islamic law. In taking decisions, instead of relying on the numerical majority, sharia emphasizes an inclusive approach involving the aspirations and support of the minority (cf. Kusuma, 2004: 257). This aspect is clearly outlined in *Ekaprasetia Pancakarsa*,

“Because of equality, shared rights and obligations of the participants, no decision should basically be imposed on the other party. Before a decision is taken on issues of common interest, prior deliberation (*musyawarah*) should be held about it. The decisions are to be made by consensus. The deliberation to achieve consensus is to be motivated by the spirit of brotherhood, which is a characteristic of the Indonesian nation. Indonesian people respect and uphold the decision of any deliberation (*musyawarah*). Therefore all the parties concerned should accept it and implement it in good intention and with a sense of responsibility. Here it is the common interest that takes precedence over personal and group interests (*Ekaprasetia Pancakarsa*, 7).”

For the Papuan, plurality of ethnic and religion are seen as wealth. Tribes are open and mutually respect and welcome each other (Tebay, 2006: 41,42). However, Theo van den Broek, (2006: 84-87) writes that it is hard for people at the coastal area to respect the people from the highland. The people in north Papua impose themselves higher than those from the south; sentiment of ethnic identity is still strong. In patriarchal system, it is

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<sup>13</sup>*Kanwula gusti* stands for the unity between the Javanese society and the king, who represents divinity; *Hakkoo Itjin* indicates the Japanese concept of unity as a family gathered from the eight corners of the world under the emperor of Japan. The socialist ideas of *fard 'ayn* and *fard kifayah* express the Islamic concept of unity between the individual and the society.

<sup>14</sup>Amalados (2008: 63), names it a consensual democracy, not majoritarian one.

hard for women to get equality with men. Sometimes populism represses minority (immigrants or small ethnics).

### *Inner Wisdom*

The fourth principle reveals the distinctiveness of the Indonesian praxis of democracy, namely, the guiding wisdom of deliberation or the moral and religious values and virtues. MPR (1978) in *Ekaprasetia Pancakarsa* describes it as follows:

“The discussion in the consultation is carried out with common sense and in accordance the noble conscience. The decisions taken should be morally accountable to God Almighty, uphold human dignity, truth and justice, promote unity and integrity, for the sake of common good.”<sup>15</sup>

The democratic process seeks to prevent conflicts through peaceful compromise. It does not mean that democracy is just for the sake of arriving at political compromises. *Ekaprasetia Pancakarsa* insists that the consultation should be based on ethical and spiritual values, or on the values of *Pancasila* - divinity, humanity, unity, deliberation and social justice. Power of rationality, consensual wisdom, and commitment to justice can bring about positive tolerance and synthesis, and prevent both major-cracy or mob-cracy and minor-cracy. The constitution and the laws, which are the pillars of democracy, have to embody these values. Generally, no authentic democracy is possible without just and democratic laws supporting it.

Basing himself especially on the principles about divinity, kinship and mutual cooperation, Ali says that Indonesian democracy is a religious democracy, involving religious considerations, mutual respect and tolerance but with preference for no particular religion.<sup>16</sup> It maintains unity by working together with the principle of balance and fairness and by trying to find a middle way (Ali, 2009: 142-152). Deliberation stresses positive tolerance. A negative tolerance that only avoids conflicts is not enough. Deliberation is a compromise or consensus for a higher purpose guided by the wisdom at the service of humanity.

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<sup>15</sup>Cf. Panitia Lima, 1980: 45. It highlights the same point when it says, “under the influence of the one and supreme God and according to the just and civilized humanity, would the democracy walk on the truth, justice, goodness, honesty, purity and beauty.”

<sup>16</sup>*Inner wisdom* does not mean that democracy has to receive religious legitimacy, as commonly understood in an integralistic state as in the *kraton* (kingdom) in Java. In the religious integralistic state the source of inner wisdom is often the superior or the leader.



The system guided by *Pancasila* does not see democracy as an end in itself but as a means for the realisation of the people's welfare and social justice (the fifth principle) (Darmaputera, 1994: 61-62; Madjid, 1997: 210-213). This was precisely the rationale why the drafters of the Constitution criticised the western democracy. A case in point is Sukarno's evaluation, "If we seek democracy, should not be a western democracy, but deliberation that gives life, the *Politiek-Economische democratie* that can bring social welfare" (Kusuma, 2004: 162). A democracy formed around *Pancasila* is both social democracy and economic democracy (Cf. Panitia Lima, 1980: 87; Ali, 2009: 116-117). Ali calls it a democracy that looks for the good of the nation, recognising people's welfare, social justice and political justice, social solidarity and national solidarity, and "religious" state (Ali 2009: 131-140).

In Papua society, deliberative democracy is guided by custom values and religious ones, the reason why it could be called religious democracy. Interventions of tribal chief relate to the tribal security that is guaranteed by harmony with the divine, nature and society (Alua, 2004: 34-35, 56-60).

### ***Democracy that Paves the Way for Interreligious Dialogue***

Based on all these values we could conclude that the acceptance of democracy by each religion in Papua facilitates cooperation and mutual respect among them especially in the public space. As *Pancasila* upholds, besides equality before law, the spirit of *kekeluargaan*, *musyawarah* (deliberation) and *mufakat* (consensus), and guiding wisdom, it creates a greater awareness of all classes and religions. *Musyawarah* (an Arabic word meaning "mutually give clue or cue") is similar to dialogue.<sup>17</sup> Dialogue intends to find out the best solution for all. The Department of Religious Affairs in Indonesia uses the term *musyawarah* to refer to the interreligious dialogue by religious leaders.<sup>18</sup>

*Musyawarah* is a sequel to the spirit of *kekeluargaan* (familial spirit) that gives priority to unity and common good than to differences and group interests. In dialogue *kekeluargaan* creates an atmosphere of openness,

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<sup>17</sup>Madjid (1997: 224-229, 244) says that in *musyawarah* there is little room for the "absolute truth"; it needs listening, comprehending, respecting the other's views, together with tolerance, respect, friendship, sense of pluralism, "loyal opposition" i.e. loyal to the common ideals and common principles of the nation.

<sup>18</sup>For example, *Wadah Musyawarah Antar-Umat Beragama* (WMAUB - Forum of Interreligious Council).

friendship and equality, steering clear of minority-majority dichotomy. *Musyawarah* in familial spirit leads to find joint solutions, *mufakat* or consensus. Both *musyawarah* and *kekeluargaan* are guided by religious wisdom (1<sup>st</sup> principle of Pancasila) and humanitarian wisdom (2<sup>nd</sup> principle) as “clue” to reach truth and goodness. Thus it promotes dialogue based on religious and ethical values enabling religions to carry out interreligious dialogue.

More than democracy’s influence on religion, its relation to the state also gives interreligious dialogue a political dimension that greatly affects the relationship between religions in the public sphere. Interreligious dialogue and cooperation for better national life could be the result of such political diplomacy.<sup>19</sup> In particular, interreligious dialogue or *musyawarah* in familial spirit guided by religious and ethical wisdom in public arena could prevent abuses of religion like politicization of religion for political gains, false ‘democracy’ based on religious legitimacy, and manipulation of the state or its structures for the interest of one’s religion.<sup>20</sup>

## Religious Communities In Papua

The exigence of democracy offered by the state do not by themselves materialise a dialogue. The flowering of dialogue is effected by the willingness of the religious communities to be motivated by democracy. This section analyses how religious groups in Papua use their theologies to define democracy. It will markedly spotlight the spirit and exercise of dialogue based on democracy in the two largest denominations of both the religions, namely, Catholics and Protestants among Christians, and *Muhammadiyah* and *Nahdlatul Ulama* (NU) among Muslims.


### *Disposition of Catholic Church towards Democracy*

Catholics in Papua began in 1905 and now spread in the whole area. Disposition of Catholic Church in Papua, especially to democracy, follows

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<sup>19</sup>Political diplomacy may be a joint declaration of the religious leaders or a consultation for the framing of religious laws.

<sup>20</sup>The chairman of the Institute for Interfaith Dialogue in Yogyakarta, E. Sarapung, (2004: 105-111), says that the concept of «tolerance» and «cooperation» has so far served as a political “mask”. In many cases, the reality of plurality in society becomes a dependable political community only for the realization of certain interests. About riots caused by politicization of religion (cf. Rumadi–Suaedy, 2007; Klinken, 2007; Bunte– Ufen, 2009).



the policy of Indonesian Catholic Church. The Indonesian Catholic Church's attitude towards democracy in the 1980s mirrored very much the universal Church's stance on democracy. Already since the Second Vatican Council (*Gaudium et Spes* n. 74 and 76), the Church has considered that, based on freedom and human rights, all are entitled to participate actively in the political life of the country. John Paul II emphasized constitutional democracy and qualified the popular participation in it as maximising the dignity of every human person (*Centesimus Annus*, n. 46-47; *Compendium of the Social Doctrine*, 2005, n. 406-417). It signifies respect for human rights and commitment to the common good, based on a theological understanding of humanity. Indonesian Catholics uphold democracy and acknowledge that *Pancasila* democracy is the best way for actualising the political participation of the people. The Church of Indonesia endorses the democratic structure, guaranteed by an efficient judiciary and multi-party system. Democracy must serve the fundamental truth or moral value, and common welfare. (Cf. PGKI, n. 18). For the sake of optimum participation in the decision-making process, the Church underlines empowerment through the provision of adequate and correct information, and freedom of expression. (Cf. PGKI, n. 61).

The Church's support for democracy in its consultative form (*musyawarah*) results from a combination of universal and local values. She recognises the harmony between the ideals of universal human rights and the local cultural value of deliberation (*musyawarah* for consensus). (Cf. PGKI, n. 61). The participants express their equality and right to participation when they jointly decide after the deliberation (Cf. UKIDMP, n. 79). The Church commends the spirit of family in the deliberation process as it overcomes the dictatorship of the majority and prioritizes common good (*gotong royong*) and harmony (justice and unity) with God and fellow-beings (accountability to God). Deliberation in the family atmosphere (*kekeluargaan*) is based on consensus. The familial spirit cannot be exploited for justifying the interests of a particular group. (Cf. UKIDMP, n. 47). Freedom in a democracy must aim at serving the truth and common good (cf. CA 46) and that goes beyond democracy. Democracy itself is only a means, and not the end (Hardawiryana, 2001: 357-359). Accordingly, the Church has been implementing *musyawarah* in catechesis. In parishes, the faithful are divided into small basic communities and each week have a session of *musyawarah* of faith. In this manner the Church intends to strengthen the civil society so that all the members can join hands, face the problems of life, and find solutions to them (Cf. SAGKI 2000: 14-19).

### *Disposition of Protestant Denominations towards Democracy of Pancasila*


Protestants in Papua are grouped in many different denominations that can be categorized in 5 mainstreams: those that join in PGI, GIDI and Kingmi, Advent Church, Pentecostal groups (PGGP, 2015). Democracy was wrenched from its Christendom matrix by the Enlightenment and social movements, and now ecumenical Christianity recognizes democracy as the best option available for the establishment of a just social order. But Christian theologians admit that modern democracy is incomplete and unfinished product (Cf. De Gruchy, 1995: 228 and 235). Democracy must be based on the manifestation of the Kingdom of God and the elaboration of the Trinitarian concept in human dignity. The Trinity shows a dynamic concept of God, moving between identity and relationship, between freedom and covenant relationship, in a relation of trust and responsibility, in freedom *for* engaging the other than freedom *from* engaging the other.

The Kingdom of God cannot be understood as an abstract utopia, but as a concrete reality that takes shape in history, without understanding it in a triumphant manner. The Kingdom of God is a peaceful kingdom, *shalom*, where there is freedom, justice and love, a power to liberate and emancipate; it is not intended to reinforce hierarchy and patriarchy, but to form a community where equality, freedom and justice flourish. The Kingdom of God opposes tyranny and provides opportunity for everyone to get involved and participate in the realization of God's plan. The Christianity in the world is understood as a manifestation of the process of liberation through the democratization process. The notion of the Church as the people of God or as communion of base communities, urges greater rank-and-file participation. The Church as *koinonia*, communion, mediates human participation in the life of the Trinity. Thus more and more people participate in the work of salvation. Democracy is the best way to achieve universal participation based on freedom, justice and love; thus, the common good, the manifestation of the Kingdom of God in the world, will become a reality.

The commitment of the Protestant denominations under PGI (in Indonesia and Papua) to democracy has evolved over time. Initially, especially in the Dutch era, they were not democratic.<sup>21</sup> During Sukarno's

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<sup>21</sup>Cf. Sumartana (2011: 327-340) that says that the Protestant Churches at first were more an alienating force than an integrative one. Only when defending the value of humanity and justice, did they begin favouring democracy. Since the French Revolution, the Protestants, led by fundamentalist clergy, had been backing the *bourgeois* parties. In



regime, they tried to keep the constitutional democracy of *Pancasila* by taking a diverging path from Sukarno, who wanted to apply “guided democracy” in a totalitarian monistic system. In 1980, in the New Order era, the Grand Assembly in Tomohon stated that power should be used only for the common good, that there should be justice and the participation of the masses (Persekutuan Gereja Indonesia, 1980: 178, 181). The IX grand Assembly, in interpreting God’s Kingdom, was more explicit and declared that politics should be for the common good and that the leaders are accountable to God (Persekutuan Gereja Indonesia, 1980: 225). During the New Order, the Protestants supported the regime, deviating to some degree from the democratic path chalked out by the theology of the kingdom of God. At the same time there was a sincere desire to study and integrate democracy into the Indonesian culture, so that democracy is not always associated with an integralist, monistic and familial concept (*Visi Baru* 1989: 19-30).

The New Order period ended with an ideological conflict.<sup>22</sup> The Protestant theologians then began to be critical and realized that in *Pancasila* the notion of family is not explicit. *Pancasila* democracy, deliberation and consensus, are not actually based on the pattern of the feudal palace<sup>23</sup>. The family, the majority-minority pattern, religious affiliations do not offer the basis of democracy. It is found in equal right to political participation in the common good (Schumann, 2006: 52-53). *Pancasila* actually wants to put democracy on a firm constitutional footing in the parliament so as to meet the demands of a state of law. Deliberation and consensus should be seen in this context.

Neither the government nor the state can vouch for democracy, as legitimacy comes from below through the civil society. Power should be

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Indonesia they gave legitimacy to colonialism and imperialism but were not tolerant towards Islam.

<sup>22</sup>Darmaputera (1993: 324), says that the Churches were then facing an ideological tension between national and primordial loyalties, and the (de)-politicization of religion (Islam). The New Order government at first saw *Pancasila* as a means of legitimation of power and then Suharto used religious legitimacy by aligning himself with Islam.

<sup>23</sup>Schumann (2006: 34, 237-256) affirms that during the Sukarno regime, *Pancasila* served as an ideology in favour of an integralistic and totalitarian state or “guided democracy”. *Pancasila* was too flexible, compromised and manipulated. In the Suharto era, under the guise of “*Pancasila* democracy”, *Pancasila* was used for finding political-religious legitimacy for ICMI and the majority religion.

returned to the people.<sup>24</sup> *Pancasila* as an accepted noble agreement should be retained but must be understood in the orientation of the civil society, for the sake of a truly democratic society<sup>25</sup>. The last “Principles of Joint Mission” (PTPB) insisted that this must be the orientation of every civil society in realizing democracy (PTPB, n. 17, 95C). A critical element emphasized in PTPB is to restore sovereignty to the people, based on legal equality (constitutional democracy).<sup>26</sup> Realizing their mistake in the Suharto era, the Protestant denominations interpret the fourth principle in the perspectives of constitutional democracy (PTPB, n. 96d), and remain vigilant democracy that can not be abused and the nation fall into militarism and totalitarianism, eliminating citizens’ participation (PTPB, n. 90). At the same time, the Protestant denominations want the Christians to participate in the political life with their evangelical perspective (PTPB, n. 94 and 97) as a means of maintaining a balance between power, justice and love.<sup>27</sup> This attitude encourages the Christian communities to fight for a state of law, fair legal norms, and the proper enforcement of *Pancasila*. (PTPB, n. 97, 100-104, 108). By giving more attention to the middle class as a base, the Protestant denominations along with like-minded religions, want to invigorate a healthy democratic process. In democratic education, they believe that religion can be a force for democracy and that democracy can encourage healthy interreligious dialogue (Sumartono, 2011: 340-341, 142).

Since 1900 Pentacostalism dan evengelicalism have entered Papua and now there are more than 25 denominations. They present the different character of Protestantism. Their prominent orientation is eschatologic life that they tend to be quite indifferent to profane life (Freston, 2001). This orientation affects their attitude to democracy. Theologically, their stress on sovereignty of God, Holy Spirit and after life (especially fundamentalist groups) makes democracy relative to religion and faith as sovereignty of God must be manifested in all life. Notwithstanding, to achieve this mission

<sup>24</sup>Sumartana (2011: 327), holds that democracy promoted by the government is less credible because it is inclined to weaken the civil society.

<sup>25</sup>A genuine true democratic society cannot be interpreted as a Christian or Muslim community. Such an orientation would jeopardise the dialogue between religions (Cf. Schumann, 2006: 52-53; 253-256; De Gruchy, 1995: 261-262).

<sup>26</sup>Cf. The Principles of Joint Mission (PTPB), n. 93abc and 97. Supit (1997: 370), says that public participation should be supported by democratic institutions and correct information (social control).

<sup>27</sup>Cf. PTPB, n. 103; Gruchy, 1995: 260. Popular sovereignty is essential to explain democracy. Christianity is not based on popular democracy; it is subject to a moral law that transcends especially the norms of equality, freedom and justice.

in pluralistic society they opted to democracy as their mother Churches in America have shown (Brint and Schroed, 2009; Malloy, 2010).

### ***Disposition of Islam***

How do Muslim communities in Papua develop democracy? After the first coming of Islam in 16 century, in modern age the first groups came in Papua in 1968s. They were MUI, Muhammadiyah, YAPIS, NU. The second wave came after year 1998 when political Islam got free space in public sphere as the fall of Soeharto. They were ICMI, HTI, *Hidayatullah*, *Assalam*, *LDII*, *dan BKPRMI* which most of them are fundamentalist. They have various concept of democracy.

For Muhammadiyah, western democracy is not everywhere compatible with Islamic governments but in Indonesia, a country with Muslim majority, the situation is different.<sup>28</sup> There are several elements of democracy in *syura* (consultation or consultative council), but democracy and *syura* are dissimilar because last one is based on God's sovereignty.<sup>29</sup> However, *syura* takes various forms according to the social context. Nashir holds that Muhammadiyah does not have a specific concept of democracy, but has institutionally acquired some key values of democracy (Fachrudin, 2005: 92). Fachrudin (2005: 90-95) studied the thoughts of Muhammadiyah activists and concludes that substantively it sees democracy in terms of certain attitudes and actions. Substantively, democracy means accepting diversity and plurality, respecting personal freedom, including freedom of opinion and expression, recognising rights and justice, equality before law, equality without discrimination, public participation, deliberation, dialogue, democratic relations, and criticism.

Muhammadiyah understands the democratic society as a structure that upholds the principles of freedom, respect for diversity, tolerance, fairness and openness (Fachrudin, 2005: 108-140; Collins, 2004: 93-120). There are those who emphasize a pluralistic, participatory, open, and egalitarian society that respects justice and equality, diversity, women's rights, and the right to make and accept criticism. However, not all the members of Muhammadiyah share these ideals. The conservatives generally

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<sup>28</sup>Buehler (2009: 51-63), says that the factors favouring democracy in Indonesia are syncretist nature of Indonesian Islam, its spirit of moderation and tolerance, decentralisation of Islamic authority, and institutional reforms.

<sup>29</sup>For more details, cf. The Aal Al-Bayt Institute for Islamic Thought, 2004: 1-15; Cheryl, 2003: 30-60.

reject the idea of democracy because it is not found in the Quran and Hadith (Fachrudin, 2005: 98-100; Udugbor, 2005: 148-153). They accept only *syura* that speaks of deliberation (*musyawarah*), dialogue and the dynamics for reaching consensus. The freedom presupposed in democracy does not exist in the Quran, as God is sovereign. Human freedom is only temporary inasmuch as humans are given roles as inheritors of the earth. This freedom must not contradict revelation. The main authority is not of the people, but of revelation, making the Quran a source of law and legitimacy. Democracy is not related to happiness in the hereafter but to the freedom of individuals to material happiness. It has no reference to the good of others, unlike *syura* which makes everyone accountable to God.<sup>30</sup> Democracy is rejected because its voting system tends to ignore equality and it is a product of the West.<sup>31</sup> Muhammadiyah's resistance to democracy is consistent with its rejection of pluralism, unlimited tolerance, and so-called equality between man and woman.

The proponents of religious pluralism actually find democracy to be consistent with *syura*.<sup>32</sup> The Quran contains the elements necessary for democracy, that is, the doctrine of justice (*al-'adl*), equality or egalitarianism (*al-Musawah*), and consultation (*syura*).<sup>33</sup> Democracy can apply the principles

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<sup>30</sup>Hosen (2007: 200-224) sees in the second amendment art. 28j (2) of 1945 Constitution, an attempt at accommodating *Sharia* substantively and giving it a 'religious value'. This indicates a pluralistic and inclusive approach and is more moderate than The Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam (CDHRI) issued by the Organization of the Islamic Conference in Cairo, Egypt (1990). The CDHRI uses word '*shariah*' to restrain freedom of opinion, indicating what is right and warning against what is wrong (*amr bi'l mar'uf wa'l nahy a'n al-munkar*) (art 22a and b).

<sup>31</sup>Udugbor (2005: 186) quotes T. Ramadan (1962- ), philosopher and son of founder of Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, and says that democracy comes from the West and autocracy from Islam.

<sup>32</sup>Cf. A. Hamid, 2014: 192-196. Udugbor (2005: 144-148) quotes several Islamic jurists supporting democracy: western democracy has an Islamic origin; it is a version of *sharia* or it comes from Islamic *bay'ah*; autocracy is a false practice of *sharia*. These views are coherent with the Amman document on democracy (Cf. The Aal Al-Bayt Institute for Islamic Thought, 2004: 1-15).

<sup>33</sup>Cf. Effendi, 2011: 155-171; Mujani, 2007: 74-75. Muhammadiyah is committed to democracy because it embodies *shura* and is in line with all the precepts of *Pancasila*. A.S. Maarif, (in Karni, 2006: xxi-xiii) says that the majority of Indonesians accept democracy not because they want to copy western political system but because they want to apply the principle of *syura* as found in Quran (3:159, 42:38).



of *syura* that recognise deliberation and dialogue based on equal rights.<sup>34</sup> The practice of *Bai'at* (oath of allegiance to a particular leader, cause or community) may be seen as a form of social and political contract between the leaders and the people, the latter having the right to control the process. In fact, the Muhammadiyah is commended for being democratic in its functions: taking decisions jointly, bridging the gap between scholars (*ulama*) and religious leaders, avoiding conferring of privileges, and empowering women so as to promote equality of rights and roles (Fachrudin 2005: 75-80). Muhammadiyah has replaced the feudal mentality with an egalitarian mind-set, empowering base communities with a resilient economy and enterprises like universities, clinics, hospitals, banks, orphanages and unions so that the people may be skilled and buoyant. Keeping a safe distance from the government, Muhammadiyah promotes through education the community tradition, encourages rationality and the freedom of opinion so that the people are ready to accept and make criticism. These attitudes are in accordance with respect for freedom, rationality, equality before law, acceptance of pluralism, religious freedom, and tolerance.

Of late the Muhammadiyah evidence divergences in its ranks regarding the manner of promoting democracy in politics. There are those who want to limit themselves to offering moral guidance, while remaining outside the government. There are some others who idolize an Islamic or *sharia* state, whereas some want to establish civil Islam society through the democratic system of political parties or through cultural movements. In 2002 in Tanwir in Bali, the social groups of the Muhammadiyah already began functioning as nuclei of the civil society. A democratic climate prevails in the civil society, with the Muhammadiyah acting as a moral force. Its members go about individually as *Abdullah* and *kehilafatullah* and

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<sup>34</sup>Hamid (2014: 11-129) lists the principles of *shura*: a) Principle of monotheism (Tawhid): obedience to *Allah* and His Apostle; b) Principle of justice (*al-'adalah*), obliging human beings to uphold God's law and avoid those opposed to it (Q 5: 48-49), leading to equality, freedom and wellbeing of all nations; c) Principle of freedom, as long as it does not clash with God and His Apostle (Q 2,256); d) Principle of consensus (*al-ijma'*); e) Principle of equality (*al-Musawat*), since all are equal before God (Q 49.13); f) Principle of promoting goodness and disallowing evil in deliberation (Q 3.114), it is democracy based on ethics; g) Principle of mutual help (*al-Ta'awun*) in kindness (Q 5,2), it is the basis for brotherhood and family; h) Principle of Divine and human rights; human rights to be understood in relationship with God; fundamental rights are theocentric; human rights and freedom are restricted by human duty as God's creatures (Q 2,178); i) Principle of consultation for consensus (*al-musyawarah*) to solve problems (Q 42.38), a pointer to unity and honour; j) Principle of tolerance (*al-Tasamuh*), respect for differences of religion and for one's freedom to choose one's faith.

sow the seeds of democracy (Jurdi, 2010: 309-313). On the question of the civil society, some members of the Muhammadiyah prefer a broader interpretation of the Quran to a literal one,<sup>35</sup> especially where it does not directly concern the state and the society, but only provides moral guidelines and principles of universal ethics, leaving space for reason (*ijtihad*) to determine the concrete form of the “civilized democracy”.<sup>36</sup> The situation is rather fluid within the Muhammadiyah and so far no decision has been taken regarding the policy to be followed in the case of promoting the civil society.

How is the NU’s position? Mulia, an NU activist and academic, holds that democracy is necessary for dialogue (Mulia, 2013: 30). Since the 1980s democracy has become a bone of contention among Indonesian Muslims. The fall of the Suharto regime, in fact, made the discussion very animated.<sup>37</sup> The themes at issue were freedom of speech, equal rights, gender, political participation, and religion in public space. NU congress in Tasikmalaya in 1994 was firm on the point that the state must be built on the basis of consensus, and must involve all the members of the society (Solusi, 2011: 753). The government, the clergy, and people should be jointly responsible for the common life.

NU’s concept of democracy is related to its notion of the state. The state is *sumnatullah*, and is willed by God to realize his plan. According to the notion of the caliphate, God is involved in the state indirectly through human conscience (Mas’udi, 2013: 62-65). The Congress of 1994 and the National Conference of Scholars of Bagu, NTB, in 1997, stressed that human authority is God’s mandate entrusted to human person by assuming

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<sup>35</sup>Effendi (2011: 77-78) distinguishes between literal and broad interpretations, the former being more legalistic and formalistic, on the assumption that Islam covers everything as God’s omnipresence does, irrespective of its physical or spiritual nature.

<sup>36</sup>Cf. Tanwir Bandung, 2012: 185. According to Nyman (2009: 259-261), religion-based civil society may threaten democratization because the civil society is primordial and is broader than all class, ethnic or religious formations. Muhammadiyah envisages the civil society as embracing plurality, that is, all religions and classes. It can, therefore, collaborate with the various Islamic groups and other religions (Cf. Hadiwinata, 2009: 276-292).

<sup>37</sup>Abuza (2006: 20) says that “NU and Muhammadiyah were essential midwives in Indonesia’s democratic transition” as Hefner (in Schwartz-Paris, 1999: 49), says that “Since the late-1980s, the largest audience for democratic and pluralist ideas in Indonesia has been not secular nationalist, but reform minded Muslim democrats. Nowhere in the Muslim world have Muslim intellectuals engaged the ideas of democracy, civil society, pluralism, and the rule of law with a vigor and confidence equal to that of Indonesian Muslims.” (Cf. Masykuri, 1997).

human modalities of honesty, justice and finance. Human beings carry out the task of the caliphate, the vehicle of God's message (Solusi, 2011: 775). The affairs of the state are worldly and, therefore, human person must take care of them based on collective *ijtihad* and in obedience to God. In this way the people can control those in power, and give corrections to the government (*Al-Nisa*, 59). Though power belongs to God, people are asked to take care of it. They can jointly determine state leadership.<sup>38</sup>

For NU, which accepted Indonesian culture, democracy has become its mode of religious living (Hefner, 2004: 18-26). It generally gives more importance to substantive democracy than the procedural one<sup>39</sup> and believes that democratic values exist in the Quran, although they can take various forms according to the concrete situation.<sup>40</sup> Democracy demands freedom of thought and expression,<sup>41</sup> equal rights without discrimination, fairness and respect for differences, and commitment to the majority decision, while procedural democracy refers to the participation of the people and the support for it by the organs of the government as the police, the courts, and the law. A democratic society is normally to be characterized by equal rights, participation of the people, freedom of expression, democracy, justice, cooperation, respect for diversity, and tolerance.<sup>42</sup> Generally NU's attitudes to democracy falls under three categories:

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<sup>38</sup>The Arabic word for 'Power' translated into Indonesian is *dawla* (daulat) which means 'turn'. So there should be no monopoly of one person or tribe (Cf. Mas'udi, 2013: 62).

<sup>39</sup>Substantial democracy signifies freedom, the mind-set to respect the rights and freedom of others, cultural pluralism, tolerance and nonviolence. Procedural democracy refers to the formal procedures of democracy like election, the Parliament, the independent judiciary and the like.

<sup>40</sup>Wahid (in Karni, 2006: xx), states that the various Islamic movements in Indonesia are the responses to the new democratic and social changes in the country; it is a healthy sign. A democratic process allows Muslims to search for a perfect system of governance that best fits their religion and ideals.

<sup>41</sup>Fachrudin (2005: 197-198), sums up the opinions of *kyais* that freedom has a religious nature. Generally *kyais* stresses responsible freedom, a freedom that takes into account the obedience to *sharia* because Islam gives priority to revelation than to reason.

<sup>42</sup>Cf. Fachrudin, 2005: 187. Karni *Editor's Note*, (in Karni, 2006: 6-20), distinguishes three attitudes to democracy: 1) pro-democracy that adopts without reserve democratic values as equality, freedom, tolerance and pluralism. They can be traditionalists, modernists, followers of NU or Muhammadiyah; 2) optional democracy that accepts democracy under certain conditions: elections, in which only Muslim men take part, formalisation of *sharia* but leaving room for compromise and commitment to peaceful change; 3) counter-democracy that opposes democracy and all its forms, including election.

rejectionist group, accommodating group, and those in between (Fachrudin, 2005: 184). According to the rejectionist group democracy is 1) alien to Islam, and is imported from the West, 2) not applied proportionately in NU because it emphasizes personal *ijtihad* (sultan) rather than collective *ijtihad*, and 3) often presented as a new ideology for developing countries, which actually in its origins is not applied in its pure form (double criteria with a hidden agenda).

The accommodating group judges democracy as being compatible with Islam, and therefore affirms the government's authority to carry out the deliberative processes of the state (*bermusyawarah*) (Kanra, 2009: 37-46). Democracy is a manifestation of the Islamic *shura*, an instrument to control the government. NU itself thinks that democracy is being implemented when full freedom is given to the *kya*is and *syurah* council (*dewan syurah*,) to express themselves and criticise. The more liberal groups want even the clergy (*kaum ulama*) to be more democratic. The group that holds the *via media* position regards democracy as a good option that needs to be adapted to Islam in Indonesia. Here personal freedom and people's sovereignty need to be bridled by obedience to God. Thus the idea of democracy does not seem to fully correspond to the western one based on law, human rights and public interest. Islamic scholars call their notion of democracy religious democracy or theo-democracy, although not necessarily based on *sharia*, but on Islamic values (substantive).

As an institution, NU declared in 1999 its formal acceptance of democracy, regardless of its being western or Islamic, at NU's *Bahtsul Masal* of XXX NU Congress in Kediri (Solusi, 2011: 796). For NU, the important thing is that the people enjoy political participation, freedom of speech, and freedom of association. Democracy must be based on universal values such as equality, freedom and pluralism, which are formally sanctioned in a social contract (law) between the state and the people. NU still stresses the religious motivation of democracy and deliberation as its inner wisdom.<sup>43</sup> The government is seen as trustworthy to enforce justice, according to *al-Nisa*, 58. It should be built on the basis of: 1) *al-Syurah* (deliberation) according to *Imran*, 159 and *Shura*, 38; 2) *al-Musawa* or equality, equal status without discrimination (*Hujurat*, 13); 3) *al-Adalah* (justice, that is objective and not subjective) according to *Nisa*, 135 and *Maidah*, 8; 4) *al-Hurriyah* (responsible freedom: *Tawba*, 105) competence to participate in the *shura*

<sup>43</sup>In Islam, *syurah* is paralleled with prayer (*shalat*) and almsgiving (*zakat*) (as-syurah, 42: 38) (Mas'udi, 2013: 85). Fachrudin (2008: 75-80) says that, in line with Sunni thinkers, NU exercises wisdom in social and political life, that is, in democracy for *maslahat* (common good) and *amar maruf nahi munkar* (to do goodness and to hinder evils).

(council); and 5) *al amanah*, (mandate) to promote honesty in upholding truth and God's mandate' (*Pedoman Politik*, n. 5).

In the practice of the deliberative process in the theo-democratic system, NU distinguishes divine authority from human authority (*ijtihad*). The truth is not decided by the majority (*al-Anam* 6,116). In the Quran there are truths which do not need to be discussed further; they already exist in the hearts of the people, prompted by God (*muhkamat, gath'i*); they are self-evident and are viewed as essential and appropriate (Mas'udi, 2013: 91-92). However, there are teachings of the Quran that need to be interpreted through *ijtihad* and *istinbath* by reliable, honest and competent persons (*ahl al-hall wa al-'aqd*). This is the reason why NU approves the representative system. And finally, there are truths, which result from a freely shared agreement of the people or their representatives on matters of state and society. They are not significantly different from the religious principles and basic values of humanity and are important for the common good and general welfare.

The scope of political power and legislation should be based on religious teachings and the methods cited above. It involves reason and faith, based on the collective wisdom (brotherhood, justice and solidarity). Immoral decisions of the majority will be rejected because democracy must be accountable to both God and people (Solusi, 2011: 798). The consensus decision should be followed by all. This shows that Islam also applies to constitutional democracy (*logocracy*), where the leader acts as judge, according to sura *al-Maidah* 5, (Mas'udi, 2013: 165, 75-76). NU's commitment to democracy becomes more resilient, when it endeavours to build a strong social basis for it, that is, a democratic society, especially a religious one through the civil society (Solusi, 2011: 798-801).<sup>44</sup> Democracy offers through the civil society an ethical vision, social solidarity, mutual trust and shared responsibility. It also facilitates the spread of equality. Through the civil society it creates an equilibrium between the society and the state. Democracy safeguards the nation from falling into integralism, as it happened in the days of Suharto and Sukarno. NU sees the civil society as being indispensable for the growth of democracy in Indonesia's pluralism. The civil society is seen as a way to build a solid social system with a democratic political basis. In the civil society democracy can influence the

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<sup>44</sup>*Pedoman Politik*, n. 9 (in PBNU, 2006) reaffirms NU's nature as a social organization, after it had almost lost its identity because of its involvement in politics. The *kittah* of 1926 seems to be the beginning of the civil society movement in NU. The qualification 'cultural movement' or cultural Islam replaced that of political Islam.

religious community's view regarding politics, *da'wah*, and the relationship between religion and the social/political system.<sup>45</sup>

Concept of democracy held by transnational Islam in Papua could be understood in relation to *tamhid*, *risalah* and *khilafah*. By *tamhid*, they believe that only God can have the every power and only Al Quran and *sunnah* of prophet can tell us His will (principle of *risalah*). In executing His will God needs His representative, that is, *khilafah* (principle of *khilafah*). Human being, therefore, get limited opportunity and freedom to compose constitution if not yet ruled by the Quran. However, it is supplementary and not contrary to the Quran and set in consensus way or direct instruction of leader. These groups do not accept plurality and dialogue as for them only Islam is the true religion. Deliberation in democracy is accepted as far as it is not set in the Quran. So far, deliberation with non-muslim is possible (Ausop, 2009: 615-17).

It is clear for us that democracy by itself could not be a guarantee of interreligious dialogue. The various concepts of democracy among religious communities could get different practices of dialogue, different forms and targets. Notwithstanding, recognition of democracy at least could pave the way for dialogue as both dialogue and democracy presuppose recognition of plurality and diversity. The true and authentic dialogue, then, should be developed and lived in accordance to religious doctrines respectively. Democracy just paves the way and creates conducive space for living interreligiously. How each religion and religious community take profit of this public space, the concept of dialogue in each community could modify content and target of democracy. In this point the deliberation based on religious values transformed to universal ones gets its importance. When democracy is practiced through deliberation (*musyawarah*) in familial spirit among religious communities, not in the pressure of majority group,

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<sup>45</sup>NU's commitment to the promotion of democracy mirrors in its education program. Through the Lakpesdam-NU program, NU wants to establish in the universities discussion forums on deliberative democracy and strengthen 'civil forums' to maximize community involvement in public life (Fachrudin, 2005: 216-226). Indonesian Islam has tried to combine western democracy and Islamic one. Karni (2006: 5-19), citing Hefner, Esposito, MC Ricklefs, observes that Indonesia has become a model for relations between Islam and democracy. Indonesians have largely accepted democracy because they see the democratic values as being in line with Islamic ones (*syura*), and being effective in articulating Muslim aspirations, as the majority voice in Indonesia. So Hefner, as cited by Karni (2006: 14), in *Editor's Note*, thinks that Indonesia could become a trail-blazer for other countries with the majority Muslim population (Sahnke-Blitt, 2005: 170-171).

democracy could provoke religion to develop interreligious dialogue as the right way to jointly search for the higher truth.



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